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Abstract
In this article we explore the approach of the Singapore
International Commercial Court (the ‘SICC’) to jurisdiction
and joinder of non-consenting parties, and way that any
resulting judgments are likely to be treated by foreign
enforcing courts. This novel juncture arises as international
commercial courts, such as the SICC, rely predominantly
upon party autonomy to enliven their jurisdiction over dis-
putants. This does not require any territorial link of the par-
ties or the dispute to the host jurisdiction (Singapore). At the
same time, however, the SICC is granted a mandate under
Singaporean law to join non-consenting parties, again with
no necessary territorial link. Where such joinder occurs, any
resulting judgment is likely to face significant difficulties if
recognition and enforcement is sought outside of Singapore.
To support this argument, we first set out the ways in which
non-consenting disputants may be joined to proceedings
before the SICC, and offer some initial thoughts on how
these powers are likely to be exercised. Second, we argue
that any such exercise of jurisdiction – that lacks either terri-
torial or consent-based jurisdiction grounds – is unlikely to
gain support internationally, by reference to transnational
recognition and enforcement approaches, and the SICC’s
most likely recognition and enforcement destinations. Final-
ly, we offer some concluding remarks about the utility of
international commercial court proceedings against non-
consenting parties, including the possibility they may impact
on domestic recognition and enforcement approaches in
foreign States.
Keywords: international commercial courts, international
business courts, third parties, third party joinder, recognition
and enforcement
1 Introduction
In early 2015, the Singaporean Government constituted
the Singapore International Commercial Court (SICC)
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as a division of the High Court of Singapore, to provide
an alternative to arbitration for the resolution of interna-
tional commercial disputes. Perhaps, most importantly,
the SICC’s jurisdiction is predominantly derived from
disputants’ exclusive choice of forum and requires no
underlying link or links to Singapore beyond this
choice. Because of this, the SICC is intimately con-
cerned with its perceived attractiveness in the eyes of
transnational disputants.1 To this end, it offers dispu-
tants more flexible court procedures compared to tradi-
tional national courts, straddling and ‘hybridising’
aspects of commercial court practice, that are ‘strongly
influenced’ by international commercial arbitration
practice.2 For example, the SICC offers a range of pro-
cedural accommodations, such as with respect to confi-
dentiality, proof of foreign law and rules of evidence.3
Further reflecting influence from arbitration, the SICC
is able to be constituted by both or either ‘local’ and
international judges, rather than solely judges trained in
a domestic legal tradition.4 These procedures are
1. This is particularly so as the SICC expressly aims to compete with inter-
national commercial arbitration, and commentators have noted the
potential role that international commercial courts may play in the face
of both long-standing and emerging concerns about the impartiality
and limited qualifications of some arbitrators: see, e.g., M. Hwang,
‘Commercial Courts and International Arbitration – Competitors or Part-
ners?’ 31(2) Arbitration International 193, at 197 (2015).
2. M. Yip, ‘The Resolution of Disputes before the Singapore International
Commercial Court’, 65(2) International and Comparative Law Quarter-
ly 439.
3. M. Yip, ‘Singapore International Commercial Court: A New Model for
Transnational Commercial Litigation’ in Ying-jeou Ma (ed.), Chinese
(Taiwan) Yearbook of International Law and Affairs (Brill, 2016) vol.
32, 155, at 156. For a comprehensive exposition of the mandate of the
SICC, and its early experiences as recorded in initial judgments, see,
generally: A. Godwin, I. Ramsay & M. Webster, ‘International Commer-
cial Courts: The Singapore Experience’ 18(2) Melbourne Journal of
International Law 1 (2017).
4. At the risk of stating the obvious, the regular use of foreign judges
diverges significantly from national court practice in Singapore (and
most of the world), where judges are drawn almost exclusively from a
local judiciary. At the same time, for those familiar with arbitral practice,
the idea that disputants may prefer, and be able to select, their decision
maker(s) – usually with expertise in the subject matter of the commer-
cial relationship, or in international dispute resolution generally – goes
without saying. Yet rather than considering the selection of the decision
maker from the central position of party autonomy (as in international
arbitration), or relatively ‘randomly’ (as most traditional courts do), the
selection of International Judges occurs via the grant of a broad discre-
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designed to be attractive to foreign disputants and to
ultimately allow the SICC to join with other Singapor-
ean institutions to ‘enhance [Singapore’s] status as a
leading forum for legal services and commercial dispute
resolution’,5 based upon the SICC reinforcing the ‘Sin-
gaporean brand’ of dispute resolution.6 Despite this
push to derive custom through attracting disputants’
exclusive choice of forum, the SICC has an express
mandate under Singaporean law to compulsorily join
non-consenting parties, including naming them as addi-
tional plaintiffs or defendants, to its proceedings.
At first glance, this seems to be an oxymoron: if the
SICC derives its jurisdiction from an exclusive choice of
forum, it should not have any ability to compulsorily
join what can be described as a ‘true’ third party.7 In
this sense, the SICC straddles the conventional arbitra-
tion-litigation divide. As arbitration is grounded in
party autonomy an arbitrator can have no authority or
jurisdiction over parties who have not agreed to arbitra-
tion.8 Reflecting this idea, allowing joinder of a ‘true’
non-consenting party (rather than a mere non-signato-
ry) has been described as ‘anathema to the internal logic
of consensual arbitration’.9 By contrast, it is usual prac-
tice for traditional courts to rely upon joinder or consol-
idation of proceedings involving third parties without
requiring their consent.10 Thus, the SICC derives juris-
diction in a ‘hybrid’ fashion: like international commer-
cial arbitration, the SICC draws upon an original exclu-
sive choice of forum between disputants who have
tion to the Chief Justice to select the judges to hear a particular dispute
or a class of disputes: see Section 9(4)(b).
5. Singapore International Commercial Court Committee, ‘Report of the
Singapore International Commercial Court Committee’ (November
2013) [55].
6. M. Hwang, ‘Commercial Courts and International Arbitration – Com-
petitors or Partners?’ 31(2) Arbitration International 193, at 196
(2015).
7. A ‘true’ third party in this scenario is a third party that is at arms-length
from the original parties and the contract between them. It is not mere-
ly a ‘non-signatory’, which suggests only that the third party may not
have complied with the requirements of writing or signature, but who
might otherwise be brought into the contract by some form of deemed
agreement. In this article, we prefer the term ‘non-consenting party’,
but we also use the terms ‘third party’ and ‘true third party’ inter-
changeably, unless otherwise apparent from the context. For an expan-
sive discussion of the operation of these ideas in the context of interna-
tional commercial arbitration, see S. Strong, ‘Third Party Intervention
and Joinder as of Right in International Arbitration: An Infringement of
Individual Contract Rights or a Proper Equitable Measure?’ 31 Vander-
bilt Journal of Transnational Law 915 (1998). In the context of interna-
tional litigation, Black and Pitel comprehensively explore the way in
which a forum selection clause may extend beyond the prima facie con-
tracting parties: V. Black and S. G. A. Pitel, ‘Forum-Selection Clauses:
Beyond the Contracting Parties’ 12(1) Journal of Private International
Law 26 (2016).
8. Noting, of course, various devices developed to join disputants to arbi-
tration despite not appearing, on the face of the arbitral agreement, to
have consented to it, as considered thematically in B. Hanotiau, Com-
plex Arbitrations: Multiparty, Multicontract, Multi-Issue and Class
Actions (Kluwer Law International, 2005) 7 (and following).
9. PT First Media TBK v. Astro Nusantara International BV [2014] 1 SLR
372 (Unreported, Court of Appeal) 197.
10. Chief Justice Hwang (of the DIFC Courts in Dubai), for example, notes
that some disputants select dispute resolution in English courts – as
opposed to international commercial arbitration – to allow for this possi-
bility: Hwang, above n. 6, 198.
agreed to arbitrate; however, it also expressly markets its
ability – underpinned by Singaporean law – to compul-
sorily join disputants to this original dispute.11 Yet, by
doing so – deriving jurisdiction from the consent of dis-
putants, with no necessary underlying link to the juris-
diction – SICC judgments lose the traditional territorial
bases for jurisdiction relied upon for recognition and
enforcement in foreign States.
It is in this uncomfortable juncture that the focus of this
article arises: given that Singaporean law authorises the
SICC to compulsorily join non-consenting parties to its
proceedings, how is any resulting judgment that does so
likely to be handled beyond Singapore? We attempt to
answer this question by focusing on what is likely to be
the most controversial subset of judgments: attempts to
join non-consenting parties who, apart from this join-
der, have no underlying link or links to Singapore. The
recognition-and-enforcement prospects of any resulting
judgments are particularly important for the SICC, as it
aims to attract foreign litigants in circumstances where
the dispute or the disputants themselves have no con-
nection to Singapore. In such cases, the third party
against whom judgment is rendered may not have sig-
nificant (or indeed, any) attachable assets within Singa-
pore.12 Where this is the case, the support of a foreign
enforcing court is required to give practical effect to the
third-party SICC judgment in most circumstances.13 In
this article, we argue that such judgments are presently
likely to face significant difficulties when recognition
and enforcement is sought outside of Singapore. To
support this argument, we make two related claims.
First, as Section 2 sets out, the SICC has a broad and
discretionary mandate to join non-consenting parties to
its proceedings. Second, as analysed in Section 3, this
mandate is not presently supported at the recognition-
and-enforcement stage, across the most likely applicable
recognition-and-enforcement regimes. These range, in
order of potential reach, from the transnational14 to the
11. Singapore International Commercial Court Committee, above n. 5, at
12.
12. S. Menon, ‘International Commercial Courts – Towards a Transnational
System of Dispute’, Opening Lecture for the DIFC Courts Lecture Series
2015:12. This is particularly likely to arise where third parties become
involved at later stages of proceedings.
13. For an exposition of the limited circumstances that parties may still pur-
sue recognition and enforcement, despite a lack of available assets, see,
further, E. Bettoni, ‘Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Money
Judgments Despite the Lack of Assets’ 10(1) New York University Jour-
nal of Law and Business 155, at 168 (and following) (2013). Indeed, it
has recently been argued that despite the seeming futility of such a
course of action, the burden of proof should be reversed such that the
judgment debtor would need to establish that enforcement of a foreign
judgment in a jurisdiction where they do not have assets is an abuse of
process: H. Kupelyants, ‘Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judg-
ments in the Absence of the Debtor and His Assets within the Jurisdic-
tion: Reversing the Burden of Proof’ 14(3) Journal of Private Interna-
tional Law 455 (2018).
14. See Section 3.1, below. These instruments are the extant Convention
on Choice of Court Agreements, opened for signature 30 June 2005, 44
ILM 1294 (entered into force 1 October 2015) (‘Convention on Choice
of Court Agreements’), which is applicable to disputants’ exclusive
choice of forum), and the broad-based Judgments Project draft, put for-
ward by Hague Conference on Private International Law, which remains
under negotiation (the most recent draft, as at the time of writing,
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reciprocal Commonwealth-driven statutory approach to
recognition and enforcement and the underlying com-
mon law it is built upon.15 As the committee tasked with
initially establishing the SICC noted, these approaches
are important as they are the primary recognition-and-
enforcement regimes that the SICC judgments are likely
to face.16 Finally, having set out why these judgments
are likely to find little legal support under transnational
recognition-and-enforcement approaches, we consider
in our concluding remarks the broader impact such
judgments may have. We turn now to consider how the
SICC approaches questions of joinder, focusing on how
the SICC may approach the joinder of non-consenting
parties.
2 Joinder of Third Parties in
the SICC under Singaporean
Law
Joinder is the process by which additional parties,
beyond the original disputants, can be added to ongoing
proceedings. This is usually at the request of one of the
original disputants, usually with the approval of the ren-
dering fora (in the context of this article, the SICC).
Thus, it logically follows that for joinder of a non-con-
senting party to occur, proceedings must have been
commenced already by the ‘original parties’ before the
SICC. For this reason, before considering the SICC’s
approach to joinder, it is prudent to briefly consider the
SICC’s jurisdiction to hear disputes over consenting
disputants.17 The SICC is constituted as a division of
the High Court of Singapore under the Supreme Court of
Judicature Act 1969 (Chapter 322),18 and as such, it has
jurisdiction to hear a cause of action where the matter:
a. is international and commercial in nature;
b. is one that the High Court may hear and try in its
original civil jurisdiction; and
c. satisfies such other conditions as the Rules of
Court may prescribe.19
These requirements are explored in some detail in the
Singapore Rules of Court at Order 110, where the terms
‘international’ and ‘commercial’ are given a broad
sphere of application, including where the original par-
ties agree the proceedings are international and com-
mercial.20 Alternatively, proceedings may be brought
comes from the Special Commission on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Judgments, held on 24-29 May 2018) (‘2018 Draft
Convention’).
15. See Section 3.2, below.
16. Singapore International Commercial Court Committee, above n. 5, at
55.
17. See, for a more detailed analysis of establishing jurisdiction before the
SICC, M Yip, above n. 3, at 163-71.
18. Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 s 18A.
19. Ibid., s 18(d).
20. Rules of Court Order 110, Rule 1, ss 2(a)(iv), 2(b)(iii).
before the SICC if the High Court of Singapore makes
an order transferring a matter commenced under its
jurisdiction to the SICC.21 Where proceedings are origi-
nally commenced before the SICC, however, the origi-
nal parties must have a written jurisdiction agreement
that states the parties’ consent and submit to the SICC’s
jurisdiction.22 For any agreement between the parties
drafted after 1 October 2016, an agreement that confers
jurisdiction to the High Court is also taken to provide
consent for the SICC to hear the matter, unless a ‘con-
trary intention appears in the agreement.’23 The
requirement of agreement as to the SICC’s jurisdiction,
as will be seen later in following part, is a significant fac-
tor in why foreign enforcing courts may give effect to
SICC judgments. However, the SICC’s reliance upon
the original parties’ consent to have a claim to jurisdic-
tion is not carried over to the power of the SICC to join
third parties. In other words, a non-consenting third
party may still be validly joined to SICC proceedings as
long as the written agreement between the original par-
ties exists, a dispute is on foot in the SICC and the third
party is validly served under Singaporean law.24
Under Singaporean law, this mandate to join third par-
ties is broad and discretionary. Specific rules for the
SICC’s joinder of third parties (termed ‘joinder of other
persons as parties’) are set out in Order 110, Rule 9,
which provides that:
1. 9.—In an action where the Court has and assumes
jurisdiction, or in a case transferred to the Court
under Rule 12, a person may, subject to paragraph
(2), be joined as a party (including as an additional
plaintiff or defendant, or as a third or subsequent
party) to the action if—
a. the requirements in these Rules for joining the
person are met; and
b. the claims by or against the person—…
(ii) are appropriate to be heard in the Court.
2. A State or the sovereign of a State may not be
made a party to an action in the Court unless the
State or the sovereign has submitted to the juris-
diction of the Court under a written jurisdiction
agreement.
3. In exercising its discretion under paragraph (1),
the Court must have regard to its international and
commercial character.
Order 15, Rule 4, of the Rules of Court clarifies that a
third party may be joined so long as the SICC provides
leave or, alternatively and additionally, if there is either
‘some common question of law or fact to be tried’ or if
all rights to relief arise from ‘the same transaction or
series of transactions’.25 These tests are similar to join-
der provisions in many other common law jurisdic-
21. Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 18J(2); Rules of Court Order
110, Rule 7, 12(1).
22. Rules of Court Order 110, Rule 7(1)(b).
23. Ibid., Order 110, Rule 1(2)(ca).
24. Ibid., Order 16, Rule 3; Order 110, 9(1).
25. Order 15, Rule 4(1)(a), Order 16, 1.
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tions.26 Thus, the only limitation to joinder of third par-
ties in the SICC is a non-mandatory consideration (in
sub-section (3)) of whether there is an ‘international and
commercial character’ to the claims against the third
party or the third party’s relationship with the original
parties.27 Consequently, there is a broad discretion for
the SICC to join a third party, other than a State. This
does not require that the third party have, or have had,
any connection to the jurisdiction in which the SICC is
constituted (Singapore), nor that the third party has
consented to the SICC’s jurisdiction. As the SICC can
join parties upon its own motion, it can even join a third
party in circumstances where all parties (including the
third party and the original parties) oppose this joinder.
Given the appearance of this broad mandate to join
third parties, the way in which this discretion is likely to
be exercised remains an open and critical question.28
Although there have been no judgments of the SICC
that join third parties,29 it is, nonetheless, possible to
venture some initial – and very tentative – observations
as to the possible contours of this discretion. First, it is
likely that the SICC’s ‘formal’ discretion to join third
parties will – over time, as case law develops – come to
mask some developing body of rules or norms.30 At
present, the only formal guidance arises in the Rules of
Court, which provides a largely discretionary basis;
however, this discretion is unlikely to prove to be unfet-
tered or completely ‘open-ended’ in practice.31 Second,
to the extent that the judgments of other Singaporean
judicial organs assist – which they may not to any signif-
icant degree, as the SICC has a unique mandate to
attract disputants with no link to Singapore – it is appa-
rent that Singaporean courts take a relatively wide
approach to the issue of joinder and misjoinder in con-
sidering the application of the Rules of Court in com-
mercial matters.32 For example, the position of the High
Court – of which the SICC is constituted as a division –
is that its power to ‘bring and keep the appropriate par-
ties before it’ is sufficiently wide to extend to allow the
joinder of a defendant even in circumstances ‘where no
cause of action is asserted against a particular defend-
ant’.33 Nevertheless, it has also been noted – albeit in a
case testing executive discretion in detention matters –
that the very ‘notion of a subjective or unfettered discre-
26. A. Reyes, ‘Recognition and Enforcement of Interlocutory and Final
Judgments of the Singapore International Commercial Court’ 2 Journal
of International and Comparative Law 337, at 355 (2015).
27. As compared to establishing jurisdiction over the original claim.
28. J. Landbrecht, ‘The Singapore International Commercial Court (SICC) –
An Alternative to International Arbitration?’ 34(1) ASA Bulletin 112, at
118-9 (2016).
29. All SICC judgments to date can be found on the SICC website, and
none of these refer to joinder: SICC – Hearings & Judgments, available
at: https://www.sicc.gov.sg/hearings-judgments/judgments (accessed
29 March 2019).
30. J. Hill, ‘The Exercise of Judicial Discretion in Relation to Applications to
Enforce Arbitral Awards under the New York Convention 1958’ 36(2)
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 304, at 306 (2016).
31. As Hill argues in the context of enforcing arbitral awards: Ibid.
32. Tan Yow Kon v. Tan Swat Ping & Ors [2006] 3 SLR 881.
33. Ibid. at [58].
tion is contrary to the rule of law’.34 Third, the situa-
tions where such joinder is likely to arise are those that
are likely to require joinder to effectively resolve a
dispute, in line with the SICC’s constituent motif of
acting in a ‘commercially sensible’ fashion. As Hwang
suggests, these may involve contracting relationships
based upon a ‘web’ of contracts, such as those arising
from ‘employer/main contractor/subcontractor’ and
‘insurance/reinsurance/retrocession’ contracts.35
Fourth, and perhaps most notably, the SICC, mindful
of the potential international enforcement difficulties
(outlined in the part that immediately follows), will like-
ly be exceedingly cautious in joining non-consenting
parties. This will particularly be the case where the
third party does not have a presence or assets within
Singapore, as recourse to foreign enforcing courts is
likely to be required. Thus, as part of its original deci-
sion to join a non-consenting party, the SICC is likely to
consider the foreign enforcement prospects of any
resulting judgment against that non-consenting party.
This kind of approach parallels what has been contro-
versially described as a ‘duty’ of arbitrators to render an
enforceable award.36 In this sense, the decision maker is
heeding not only his or her own local law (which, in the
case of the SICC, allows broad discretion with respect to
joinder) but is taking a proactive stance in attempting to
render a judgment that is likely to be acceptable for its
intended enforcement audience. Keeping in mind these
tentative views about the way in which the SICC’s dis-
cretion to join third parties is likely to be exercised, it is
useful to turn now to consider the treatment any result-
ing judgments may face when they come for recognition
and enforcement in foreign courts.
3 Recognising and Enforcing
SICC Judgments against
Non-consenting Parties
To be able to compete for disputant custom with other
forms of international commercial dispute resolution,
the SICC needs to satisfy disputants that its judgments
will be recognised and enforced in other jurisdictions. It
is in this context that a potential disconnect arises
between the SICC’s broad-based discretionary approach
to joinder of non-consenting parties and the more
restrictive approach of enforcing courts. If such judg-
ments are not supported by recognition-and-enforce-
ment regimes, this limits the SICC judgment’s utility
34. Chng Suan Tze v. Minister for Home Affairs [1988] 2 SLR(R) 525 at
[86].
35. Hwang, above n. 6, at 195.
36. As Platte notes, there is some controversy in describing this as a ‘duty’
that an arbitral panel faces, but a consideration of eventual recognition-
and-enforcement prospects is nonetheless an identifiable phenomenon
within the context of international commercial arbitration: M. Platte,
‘An Arbitrator’s Duty to Render Enforceable Awards’ 20(3) Journal of
International Arbitration 307 (2003).
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(to the extent it binds a third party) beyond Singapore.
Note that we do not consider in significant detail the
recognition-and-enforcement prospects of a judgment
made against an original party to SICC proceedings,
although it should perhaps be noted there are relevant
severance provisions under the recognition-and-
enforcement regimes studied in this article that allow for
a judgment to be recognised and enforced against one
party (e.g., an original party) but not another (e.g., a
non-consenting third party) if only part of a judgment is
eligible for recognition and enforcement.37 To explore
the impact of recognition and enforcement on non-con-
senting parties, we first consider the likely treatment of
a SICC judgment that compulsorily joins a third party,
under the two key ‘global’ transnational regimes, before
considering the Commonwealth-driven statutory recip-
rocal recognition-and-enforcement regime (and the
common law that underlies it). As the Committee
Report setting up the SICC noted originally, these
approaches are important as they are the primary recog-
nition and enforcement that SICC judgments are likely
to face.38 As the remainder of this part discusses,
enforcement difficulties are likely to arise as each regime
requires some connection, or submission, to the juris-
diction of the rendering court, for obligations to recog-
nise and enforce to activate. This stands in contrast to
the SICC’s discretionary mandate, which does not
require either factor.
3.1 Transnational Recognition-and-
Enforcement Regimes
Perhaps the most effective way that the enforcement
prospects of SICC judgments can be communicated is
in circumstances where some form of transnational trea-
ty-based regime compels a foreign enforcing court to
give effect to these judgments. Ease of transnational rec-
ognition and enforcement is particularly important for
the SICC, as it is pitched at attracting disputants and
competing with – or at least as an alternative to – not
just courts but also arbitral tribunals.39 The product of
the latter, of course, has the benefit of widespread facili-
tated recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards
under the 1958 UNCITRAL Convention on the Recogni-
tion and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards (hereafter ‘the
New York Convention’).40 To explore the treatment of
foreign judgments, we set out the approach of the two
key ‘global’ transnational instruments that govern the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and
37. See, e.g., ‘Convention on Choice of Court Agreements’, above n 14,
Art. 15; ‘2018 Draft Convention’ above n 14, Art. 9; and, the Recipro-
cal Enforcement of Commonwealth Judgments Act (Chapter 264)
s 3(3)(b), which grants the enforcing court ‘the same control and juris-
diction over the judgment’ as it would judgments of the enforcing
court.
38. ‘Report of the Singapore International Court Committee’, above n. 5,
[42]-[46].
39. Ibid. at 11-12.
40. The reach of which is clear from its widespread acceptance globally:
UNCITRAL, Status – Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958), available at: http://
www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/
NYConvention_status.html (accessed 12 January 2019).
consider how they might apply to a third-party judg-
ment of the SICC. First, and the only instrument cur-
rently in force, is the 2005 Convention on Choice of Court
Agreements (‘2005 Convention’), currently in force
between the European Union (and all of its Member
States), Mexico, Montenegro, Singapore and the United
Kingdom.41 The 2005 Convention aims to harmonise
and promote the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments in a similar fashion to the New York Con-
vention’s approach to arbitral awards. It applies only
where parties to a dispute have validly entered into an
agreement that exclusively determines a forum to have
jurisdiction over their dispute.42 In other words, it can
only apply upon one jurisdictional basis: where a forum
(or potentially multiple fora) in a single jurisdiction is
chosen and the jurisdiction of other courts/States is
clearly excluded.43 For the sake of simplicity, we refer to
this forum as the ‘rendering court’ (which, in the con-
text of this article, is the SICC). Broadly mirroring the
New York Convention, and also the SICC’s constitutive
requirements in the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, the
2005 Convention has broad application to international
commercial and civil matters, with only limited excep-
tions.44 As such, it has real application to judgments
rendered by the SICC and, understandably, forms a key
part of the SICC’s marketed enforcement strategy.45 At
present, the 2005 Convention is the only transnational
recognition-and-enforcement regime that is in force.
The second instrument, which remains under negotia-
tion (albeit at an advanced stage), is encapsulated in the
approach of the draft Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments (the ‘Draft Judgments
Convention’).46 The negotiations underpinning this
draft are undertaken under the auspices of the Hague
Conference on Private International Law, with a view
towards finalisation of a Convention at a targeted Diplo-
matic Session in mid-2019.47 These negotiations are also
referred to as the broad-based judgments project, as
they take a broader approach to jurisdictional bases than
the sole base of an exclusive choice of forum (covered in
the 2005 Convention). As with the 2005 Convention and
the New York Convention, the Draft Convention has
broad application to a range of international civil and
41. Hague Conference on Private International Law, HCCH | #37 – Status
Table, available at: https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/
status-table/?cid=98 (accessed 29 March 2019). Note that some of
these States, whilst signatories to the Convention, have not yet
implemented it into their domestic laws. See, e.g., China and the United
States of America.
42. ‘Convention on Choice of Court Agreements’, above n. 14, Art 3(a).
43. Ibid., Art 1.
44. Ibid., Art 1(1).
45. See, for example, Singapore International Commercial Court, ‘Note on
Enforcement of SICC Judgments’ 2, available at: https://
www.sicc.gov.sg/docs/default-source/guide-to-the-sicc/
sicc_enforcement_guide2cac21700a1d6b0c895eff0000f6c7a3.pdf
where it is noted, at [2], that “SICC judgments can be enforced in
almost all major commercial jurisdictions and in many other regional
ones”.
46. ‘2018 Draft Convention’, above n. 14.
47. Hague Conference on Private International Law, ‘Conclusions & Rec-
ommendations Adopted by the Council’ in Council on General Affairs
and Policy of the Conference (2018):1.
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commercial matters in dispute, excluding only some
limited areas, such as intrinsically sensitive disputes
relating to consumer and employment matters, insol-
vency and some aspects of intellectual property law.48
Whilst the Draft Convention allows for a range of
acceptable bases of jurisdiction, these bases broadly rely
either upon disputant consent or submission to the
jurisdiction of the rendering court (similar to the 2005
Convention) or, alternatively, upon whether there is a
sufficient connection between the parties or matter with
the jurisdiction of the rendering court. The relationship
between these themes in providing bases for establishing
jurisdiction and eligibility of SICC judgments for recog-
nition and enforcement against non-consenting parties
under both conventions will be explored below.
3.1.1 Consent and Submission to Jurisdiction
Given our focus on SICC judgments against third par-
ties coercively joined to proceedings, it should be imme-
diately evident that jurisdictional grounds related to
consent and submission are unlikely to oblige a foreign
court to give effect to any such judgment (or at least the
part that purports to extend to the third party). For
clarity, however, it is useful to set out why this is so, by
considering the nature of the transnational recognition-
and-enforcement provisions and the different methods
by which a party may have consented or submitted to
the jurisdiction of the court.
(a) Contractual agreements
Cumulatively, the 2005 Convention and the Draft Con-
vention cover all jurisdictional bases related to parties
consenting by agreement to the rendering court’s juris-
diction. These jurisdictional bases, however, are unlike-
ly to be established where recognition and enforcement
is sought against a non-consenting party coercively
joined to SICC proceedings.
Let us first turn to the 2005 Convention, which applies
only in circumstances where parties make an exclusive
choice of forum in favour of the rendering court (Arti-
cles 1 and 8). If any choice of forum is made, it is likely
to be construed as an exclusive one (at least under Sin-
gaporean law), as Section 18F(1)(b) of the Singaporean
Judicature Act49 provides that any agreement conferring
jurisdiction over a matter to the SICC is taken to be an
exclusive agreement. To this end, Article 8(1) of the
2005 Convention provides that:
(1) A judgment given by a court of a Contracting
State designated in an exclusive choice of court
agreement shall be recognised and enforced in other
Contracting States in accordance with this Chapter.
Recognition or enforcement may be refused only on
the grounds specified in this Convention.
In any event, the Draft Convention, if successful, will
cover the remainder of the field of third-party agree-
ment. This is because Article 4 of the Draft Convention
48. ‘2018 Draft Convention’, above n. 14, Art. 2.
49. Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (Singapore).
provides a similar obligation to recognise and enforce
judgments that meet one or more bases for recognition
in Article 5. Relevantly for consent to a particular
forum, such as the SICC, Article 5(1)(m) provides a
jurisdictional base if:
(m) the judgment was given by a court designated in
an agreement concluded or documented in writing or
by any other means of communication which renders
information accessible so as to be usable for subse-
quent reference, other than an exclusive choice of
court agreement.
For the purposes of this sub-paragraph, an ‘exclusive
choice of court agreement’ means an agreement con-
cluded by two or more parties that designates, for the
purpose of deciding disputes which have arisen or may
arise in connection with a particular legal relationship,
the courts of one State or one or more specific courts of
one State to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any oth-
er courts. Thus, the Draft Convention – in a bid to
extend application to choice-of-forum agreements that
would not be covered under the 2005 Convention – cre-
ates a jurisdictional basis for recognition and enforce-
ment for all other ‘non-exclusive’ choices of forum.50
What is immediately apparent is that these provisions,
to activate obligations in favour of recognition and
enforcement, require the third party to have ‘designa-
ted’ a court. Thus, they do not extend any obligation to
recognise and enforce foreign judgments against third
parties who have not manifested consent in some way.
This is so even in circumstances where a third party
may be factually implicated or involved in a matter
which is governed by a choice-of-forum agreement that
conferred jurisdiction upon the rendering Court.51 It
should be noted, however, that a party against whom
recognition and enforcement is sought need not be a
party to the original agreement conferring jurisdiction
upon the Court. If a third party submits and consents to
the SICC’s jurisdiction – at any time before or during
the dispute – Convention obligations may apply, as at
this point, they will have designated a court. Under both
the Draft Convention and the 2005 Convention, the
only formality required for this agreement is that it be
‘in writing’ or ‘any other means of communication
which renders information accessible so as to be useable
for subsequent reference’.52 Therefore, if a third party
provides consent in this manner, a SICC judgment is
eligible for recognition and enforcement under these
instruments. However, without any consent, no obliga-
tions arise for enforcing courts to give effect to any
judgment (or part thereof) against a third party. Conse-
quently, SICC third-party judgments do not stand to be
recognised or enforced under consent-based jurisdic-
50. By excluding agreements under the Convention to avoid overlap: ‘Judg-
ments Convention: Revised Preliminary Explanatory Report’ (May 2018)
41-2 [188].
51. Reyes, above n. 26, at 355.
52. ‘Convention on Choice of Court Agreements’, above n. 14, Art. 3(c).
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tional grounds in both the extant and proposed transna-
tional recognition-and-enforcement instruments.53
(b) Deemed consent via procedural submission
In addition to jurisdictional bases premised upon con-
sent to a choice of forum, the Draft Convention also
provides further bases for recognition and enforcement
based upon what can be broadly termed ‘consent
through procedural submission’. The first of these ari-
ses if the person against whom recognition and enforce-
ment is sought brought the original claim in the render-
ing court (Article 5(1)(c)). By definition, this cannot be
the third party, so it has no application. Article 5(1)(l)
may also have some reach against third parties, as it cre-
ates a jurisdictional base for recognition and enforce-
ment against any party if they join in the original pro-
ceedings and bring on a counterclaim, unless the filing
of the counterclaim was necessary ‘to avoid preclusion’.
In these circumstances, lodgement of the counterclaim
is seen as constituting submission to the jurisdiction of
the SICC.54 However, it is unlikely a properly advised
third party resisting the SICC’s jurisdiction would vol-
untarily involve themselves in proceedings to such an
extent as to bring a counterclaim. A third party will also
be deemed to have consented, pursuant to Arti-
cle 5(1)(e) of the Draft Convention, if it ‘expressly con-
sented to the jurisdiction of the court of origin in the
course of the proceedings in which the judgment was
given’. In this way, a party seeking recognition and
enforcement may raise an argument that a third party
consents to the SICC’s jurisdiction, if that third party
argued the merits of the case. However, this express
consent is not easy to prove. Indeed, the Revised Pre-
liminary Explanatory Report,55 states that a mere failure
to contest the rendering Court’s jurisdiction under the
laws of the State of origin is not enough to represent
express consent to jurisdiction for the purposes of Arti-
cle 5(1)(e). This is so even in the event that the third
party goes on to argue the merits of the case before the
Court as a participant in the proceedings.56 Nonetheless,
provided a third party objects to the SICC establishing
jurisdiction over the original dispute in a timely manner,
it is unlikely this provision would provide a basis for
recognition and enforcement of SICC judgments in for-
eign jurisdictions against coercively joined third parties.
The application of Article 5(1)(f) further reinforces the
need for express consent or direct submission to the
jurisdiction of the rendering court for a judgment to be
eligible for recognition and enforcement. This jurisdic-
tional ground arises where:
53. Reyes, above n. 26, at 356.
54. ‘Judgments Convention: Revised Preliminary Explanatory Report’,
above n. 50, 41 [193].
55. Ibid., 43 [140].
56. Ibid., 43 [140]. For examples of express consent, see 32 [142] of the
Preliminary Explanatory Report, including where a party agrees to
defend a case in the jurisdiction of a State in correspondence or the
defendant orally informs the court of an acceptance of its jurisdiction to
hear the matter.
the defendant argued on the merits before the court
of origin without contesting jurisdiction within the
timeframe provided in the law of the State of origin,
unless it is evident that an objection to jurisdiction or
to the exercise of jurisdiction would not have suc-
ceeded under that law.
This provision clarifies, in discussing the point at which
a party must object and contest submission and in com-
bination with Article 5(1)(e), that if a party properly and
promptly contests or opposes the jurisdiction of the ren-
dering court, there will be no grounds for recognition
and enforcement under the Draft Convention where the
party continues to argue the case if their objection to
jurisdiction is unsuccessful.57 It should be noted that the
use of the word ‘defendant’ includes third parties joined
to proceedings, with defendant defined under the Draft
Convention as ‘a person against whom the claim or
counterclaim was brought in the State of origin’.58
Therefore, Article 5(1)(f) appears to offer a basis for rec-
ognition and enforcement of judgments against third
parties if they do not object to the Court’s jurisdiction,
despite any disagreement they may have with it, as a
failure to object would amount to submission and
implied consent.59
Nonetheless, this jurisdictional ground remains prob-
lematic. First, it appears the clause is intended to allow
for recognition and enforcement where disgruntled par-
ties are dissatisfied with the judgment delivered from
the rendering court and decide to challenge the jurisdic-
tion of the rendering court to avoid compliance. Second,
and perhaps more fundamentally, the operation of the
latter part of 5(1)(f) – which provides an exception to
relying upon a failure to object to jurisdiction as a basis
for resisting recognition and enforcement – must be
considered. Somewhat paradoxically, it may be that the
SICC’s broad discretion to join third parties – if ‘appro-
priate to do so’, as discussed above – may limit the recog-
nition-and-enforcement prospects of any resulting judg-
ment against the third party. This is because it increases
the likelihood of the latter part of 5(1)(f) coming into
operation to exclude this ground as a basis for recogni-
tion and enforcement in many cases.60 The strong trans-
national mandate of the SICC, including express refer-
ences to its ability to join third parties,61 coupled with
the absence of clear criteria required to join a third party
to proceedings, makes it difficult to establish that a chal-
lenge to jurisdiction would have been successful. There-
fore, it will be difficult to argue a third party should be
deemed to have submitted to the SICC’s jurisdiction by
failing to raise an objection, particularly because of the
high threshold requiring that it be ‘evident’ that a chal-
57. Ibid., 43 [148].
58. Hague Conference, above n. 47, Art. 3(1)(a); ‘Judgments Convention:
Preliminary Explanatory Report’, above n. 50, 14-15 [64]-[66].
59. ‘Judgments Convention: Preliminary Explanatory Report’, above n. 50,
28 [134].
60. Ibid., 29 [142].
61. ‘Report of the Singapore International Court Committee’, above n. 5,
[22]-[25].
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lenge would fail.62 Nonetheless, the Preliminary
Explanatory Report suggests that a common method by
which it could be shown that an objection would fail is
for the enforcing court to consider past cases.63 Given
that the SICC’s stated approach at its most extreme
– joining to proceedings parties who have no territorial
link to Singapore – is novel internationally and is the
dearth of any cases in the SICC attempting to join a
third party, this is, however, unlikely to offer insight.
To the extent, however, that a permissive approach to
joinder develops over time in the SICC, the greater the
basis for the third-party judgment debtor to resist rec-
ognition and enforcement (even if the third party failed
to object to the SICC’s jurisdiction in the original deci-
sion).
3.1.2 Territorial Connections to Jurisdiction
Most other jurisdictional bases for recognition and
enforcement identified under the Draft Convention rely
upon some form of territorial, personal or real connec-
tion between either the parties or the transaction/matter
that gave rise to the dispute and the country of the ren-
dering court. Considering the flexibility of the SICC’s
ability to join third parties who have no significant con-
nection to Singapore, and the focus of the SICC to hear
and decide international matters, it is evident there
would be extreme difficulties in relying upon this cate-
gory of eligibility grounds in seeking enforcement of
SICC third-party judgments. The majority of these
grounds are set out in Article 5,64 and Article 5(1)(a-b),
(d) and (g)–(k) and the entirety of Article 6 of the Draft
Convention all make reference to either the parties or
cause of action having a connection to the ‘state of ori-
gin’ (the jurisdiction of the rendering court). Similar
issues arise as with the consent grounds because it is a
requirement that the party against whom recognition
and enforcement is sought be the party that satisfies the
basis for recognition and enforcement.
Article 5(1)(a) of the Draft Convention, as an example of
a clause referring to the state of origin, provides a basis
for recognition and enforcement where:
a. the person against whom recognition or enforce-
ment is sought was habitually resident in the State
of origin at the time that person became a party to
the proceedings in the court of origin;65
What is interesting about this provision – and several of
the provisions relating to a connection to the state of ori-
gin – is that the word ‘person’ (rather than ‘defendant’,
for example) is used in order to potentially extend the
categories of persons against whom recognition and
62. ‘Judgments Convention: Preliminary Explanatory Report’, above n. 50,
29 [143].
63. Ibid., 29 [144].
64. These connections are well rehearsed and widely accepted, including,
for example, formulations based upon the place of business, ordinary or
habitual residence of one or more of the parties, the place for where the
transaction occurred or the location of the property in dispute. See, e.g.,
the factors set out in the 2018 Draft Convention, above n. 14, Art. 5.
65. ‘2018 Draft Convention’, above n. 14, Art. 5(1)(a).
enforcement can be sought.66 This is explored further in
the Preliminary Explanatory Report produced by the
Working Group, however, where it is noted that a ‘per-
son’ against whom recognition and enforcement is
sought must be the one who has the connection to the
state of origin.67 Where a third party has been joined to
proceedings without such a connection, the fact that
another party against whom judgment may also have
been rendered was connected to the state of origin (and
therefore against whom a judgment is recognisable and
enforceable) does not provide a basis for recognition and
enforcement against the unconnected third party. The
Draft Convention is also relatively clear that for com-
mercial matters, a connection to the state of origin is
required to establish a ground for recognition and
enforcement (unless, of course, consent or submission
can be established). With respect to non-contractual
obligations (primarily where a cause of action can be
founded in tort), ‘the act or omission directly causing…
harm’ must have occurred in the state of origin for a
judgment to be eligible for recognition and enforce-
ment.68 Similarly, judgments rendered in respect of a
(breached) contractual obligation also require a connec-
tion to the state of origin. Eligibility will be established
where the obligation was, or should have been, per-
formed ‘unless the defendant’s activities in relation to
the transaction clearly did not constitute a purposeful
and substantial connection to that State’.69 Therefore,
the Draft Convention expresses a strong intention to
only provide a basis for recognition and enforcement
where the central act, omission or transaction to the
cause of action is sufficiently connected to the state ren-
dering judgment. As a result, none of these territorial
grounds activate any obligations under the Draft Con-
vention to recognise and enforce SICC judgments
against third parties with no territorial link to Singapore
in the types of matters referred to in this article.
By way of brief recapitulation, then, the SICC’s poten-
tially broad approach to compulsory joinder (requiring
no link to Singapore) seems incompatible, or at least
unsupported, by obligations to recognise and enforce
judgments under both the 2005 and the Draft Conven-
tions. Even if this were not the case, and a jurisdictional
base could be found against a non-consenting third
party, it may be that joinder of this third party would
offend the public policy of the enforcing State, and
hence be a reason to refuse to give effect to a foreign
judgment.70 Given that there is unlikely to be an accept-
66. ‘Judgments Convention: Preliminary Explanatory Report’, above n. 50,
23 [111].
67. Ibid., 23-4 [111]-[113]; see also (from the 2016 Draft Convention
where the bases read the same): ‘Explanatory Note Providing Back-
ground on the Proposed Draft Text and Identifying Outstanding Issues’
(April 2016) 18 [70].
68. ‘2018 Draft Convention’, above n. 14, Art. 5(1)(h). It should be noted,
however, that the harm itself need not occur in the state of origin so
long as the act or omission causing it is sufficiently connected.
69. Ibid., Art. 5(1)(g).
70. As Black and Pitel suggest, joinder of a third party in a manner that is
not consistent with or supported by the law of the enforcing court may
be such an example: Black and Pitel, above n. 7, at 58 (at fn 120).
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able jurisdictional basis in the first instance, issues of
public policy do not directly arise (as there is no need to
activate a ground for refusal). Nonetheless, for com-
pleteness sake, we note that a public policy ground for
refusal exists in both the 2005 Convention (Article 9(e))
as well as the 2018 Draft Convention (Article 7(1)(c)),
where giving effect to a foreign judgment is ‘manifestly
incompatible’ with the enforcing court’s public policy.
Because of the difficulty of achieving recognition and
enforcement under transnational instruments, other
international and domestic approaches to recognition
and enforcement become of greater importance for the
SICC. For this reason, we turn to consider the preemi-
nent international recognition-and-enforcement scheme
that the SICC relies upon in this respect.
3.2 The Commonwealth Model and Common
Law Approaches to Recognition and
Enforcement
Despite a lack of transnational obligations on foreign
enforcing courts to recognise and enforce, SICC judg-
ments against coercively joined third parties, neverthe-
less, stand to be considered under other transnational or
domestic recognition-and-enforcement approaches.
This is because the transnational obligations, set out in
the immediately preceding section, primarily hold par-
ticipating States only to a set of minimum standards
which provide a ‘floor’ for when a judgment must be
given effect to.71 As a result, enforcing courts of States
that implement a relevant recognition-and-enforcement
instrument can never violate it by giving effect to for-
eign decisions, instead, ‘only by failing to do so’.72 In
other words, if a transnational instrument does not
oblige an enforcing court to give effect to a foreign deci-
sion, this remains a matter for the municipal (domestic)
law of the enforcing court. Indeed, even if a ground for
refusal is found, enforcing courts remain free to still
give effect to the offending foreign decision.73 This
means that there is scope for enforcing courts, if consis-
tent with their domestic laws, to recognise and enforce a
third-party SICC judgment, above and beyond their
minimum obligations under transnational instruments.
71. See, in the context of the 2005 Convention, Ronald A Brand and Paul
Herrup, The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements:
Commentary and Documents (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 23.
The Draft Convention as well as the New York Convention also follow a
similar approach. Note, however, that domestic approaches can choose
to refrain from providing residual recourse to national law. See, e.g.,
s 2A of the Singaporean version of the Commonwealth Model, as
reflected in Reciprocal Enforcement of Commonwealth Judgments Act
(Chapter 264) (Singapore). This provision clarifies that ‘this Act [Singa-
pore’s implementation of the Commonwealth Model] does not apply to
any judgment which may be recognised or enforced in Singapore under
the Choice of Court Agreements Act 2016’.
72. M. Paulsson, The 1958 New York Convention in Action (Wolters Klu-
wer, 2016) 124. Paulsson’s comments are made with respect to the
New York Convention but are equally applicable to both the 2005 Con-
vention and the 2018 Draft Convention.
73. See, in the context of 2005 Convention, Brand and Herrup, above
n. 71, at 110, who note that the use of the permissive language of
‘may’ allows this (Art. 9 of the 2005 Convention). This is consistent
with the approach of the Draft Convention (Art. 7(1) provides ‘Recog-
nition or enforcement may be refused if …’).
Although this article is in no way intended as an exhaus-
tive overview of domestic recognition-and-enforcement
practice globally, given Singapore’s common law herit-
age and its stated recognition-and-enforcement audi-
ence,74 it is useful to consider as an exemplar how a
third-party SICC judgment would be treated under the
Commonwealth Model of recognition-and-enforcement,
which itself is premised upon the common law.
3.2.1 Recognition and Enforcement under the
Commonwealth Model
The SICC, as a key component of its enforcement strat-
egy, emphasises the enforcement prospects available to
its judgments under the British dominion- and Com-
monwealth-inspired Reciprocal Enforcement Acts.75
For this reason, despite its evident inapplicability to
third-party joinder, it is useful to briefly consider this
approach. Referred to in this article as the ‘Common-
wealth Model’, this model refers to a series of reciprocal
acts, originally promulgated in and by the United
Kingdom, that serve to promote and privilege recogni-
tion and enforcement between several historically rela-
ted States.76 The Administration of Justice Act 1920
(UK) is the first of two Acts that constitute the funda-
ment of the Commonwealth Model. Section 9 of the
1920 Act establishes the basic registration system that
underlies the model, relevantly providing that:
Where a judgment has been obtained in a superior
court in any part of His Majesty’s dominions outside
the United Kingdom to which this Part of this Act
extends, the judgment creditor may apply to the
[enforcing court] … to have the judgment registered
in the court, and on any such application the court
may, if all the circumstances of the case, they think it
just and convenient that the judgment should be
enforced in the United Kingdom, and subject to the
provisions of this section, order the judgment to be
registered accordingly.
The Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act
1933 (UK) is ‘patterned closely’ on the 1920 Act,77 and
provisions modelled on this Act are in force in many
Commonwealth countries, for example, New Zealand,
Singapore and Zimbabwe. To a greater extent than the
1920 Act, it is based on concepts of reciprocity rather
than dominion;78 for example, it allows judgments
obtained in specified courts of other Commonwealth
States, privileged under bilateral treaties, to be enforced
via registration – including in Australia, Canada,
74. ‘Report of the Singapore International Court Committee’, above n. 5,
see 20-2 [42]-[51].
75. Ibid., [42].
76. Each jurisdiction thus has its own Acts, but they are, in large, part mod-
elled on the original UK Acts: Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforce-
ment) Act 1933 (UK) ch. 13, 23 and 24 Geo 5; Administration of Jus-
tice Act 1920 (UK) ch. 81, 10 and 11 Geo 5.
77. B. Paige, ‘Foreign Judgments in American and English Courts: A Com-
parative Analysis’ 26(3) Seattle University Law Review 591, at 611
(2003).
78. See Section 1 of the 1933 Act, which establishes the requirement for
reciprocity.
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Guernsey and India. Read together, these Acts demon-
strate that the Commonwealth Model operates as a stat-
utory judgment registration system, premised on the
idea that States that share a degree of familiarity and
legal and institutional similarity should derive greater
comfort in giving preferential treatment to foreign judg-
ments originating from the ‘recognised’ courts of other
such States.79 Importantly, this approach is not depen-
dent or even necessarily premised on international trea-
ties; instead, this is a reciprocal statutory registration
scheme, the participation of which is largely driven
either by British dominion or historical ties to Empire
or the Commonwealth. Consequently, the model refers
and relies upon the underlying common law in each par-
ticipant State, as reflected in the model’s approach to
recognition and enforcement. This can be seen by the
model adopting, consistent with the common law, a pre-
sumption in favour of recognition and enforcement,
subject to the usual exceptions for potentially objection-
able judgments or classes of judgments (usually on
grounds of procedural fairness).80 In fact, this presump-
tion is likely strengthened as the model seems to
(implicitly) presume that a foreign judgment is recog-
nisable, rather than placing the onus of proving this on
the plaintiff (as the common law usually does).
Unfortunately for the prospects of judgments against
non-consenting parties, the Commonwealth Model does
not provide for judgments to be given effect to if the
third party has no territorial link to the rendering court
or did not consent or submit to the jurisdiction of the
SICC. Indeed, such judgments are expressly excluded
from the statutory scheme. To make this point – given
our focus on the SICC – we consider both the Singapor-
ean implementation of the Commonwealth Model as
well as the original United Kingdom formulation, not-
ing that the approach of both is broadly consistent with
the approaches in most international implementations of
the Commonwealth Model.81 First, with respect to the
Singaporean Act, an attempt to give effect to a foreign
judgment against a third party is frustrated by Sec-
tion 3, which sets out a series of ‘Restrictions on regis-
trations’, and relevantly provides:
(2) No judgment shall be ordered to be registered
under this section if —
a. the original court acted without jurisdiction;
b. the judgment debtor, being a person who was nei-
ther carrying on business nor ordinarily resident
79. Previously referred to as ‘superior’ courts: Civil Jurisdiction and Judg-
ments Act 1982 (UK) Sch 10.
80. Paige, above n. 77, at 619.
81. Reciprocal Enforcement of Commonwealth Judgments Act (Chapter
264) (Singapore). This is not surprising, as like other Commonwealth
Model participants, the Act is drawn closely upon the original UK Act.
See: H. L. Ho, ‘Policies Underlying the Enforcement of Foreign Com-
mercial Judgments’ 46(2) The International and Comparative Law
Quarterly 443, at 456 (1997). Note that there is also another Singapor-
ean Act, The Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (Chap-
ter 265), which only has application to Hong Kong and thus is of limited
use in assessing international prospects of recognition and enforcement:
‘Report of the Singapore International Commercial Court Committee’,
above n. 5, at 20 [42].
within the jurisdiction of the original court, did
not voluntarily appear or otherwise submit or
agree to submit to the jurisdiction of that court;
…
This is consistent with the approach in the 1933 Act in
the United Kingdom,82 Section 4 of which relevantly
provides:
(1) On an application in that behalf duly made by any
party against whom a registered judgment may be
enforced, the registration of the judgment—
(a) shall be set aside if the registering court is satisfied
—
…
(ii) that the courts of the country of the original court
had no jurisdiction in the circumstances of the case;
or
…
(v) that the enforcement of the judgment would be
contrary to public policy in the country of the regis-
tering court; …
Both Acts – again, representing exemplars of the Com-
monwealth Model more broadly – provide further pro-
visions that deem certain areas within the rendering
court’s jurisdiction. However, consistent with the trans-
national experience set out above, these factors require
some territorial or consent-based link to establish juris-
diction.83 Absent such links, a SICC judgment implicat-
ing a non-consenting third party is not able to be recog-
nised or enforced under the Commonwealth Model.
3.2.2 Common Law Recognition and Enforcement
Underlying the Commonwealth Model is each partici-
pating jurisdiction’s residual common law approach to
recognition and enforcement. This reliance on the com-
mon law is seen in the approach and design of the Mod-
el, but also in instances where the Model allows further
residual recourse to common law enforcement, even in
circumstances where both transnational and Common-
wealth Model regimes are either not plead or are, for
some reason, excluded or inapplicable. In this sense,
jurisdictions that more closely model the approach in
the 1920 UK Act allow for residual recourse to the com-
mon law, even if that statutory regime does not apply or
is excluded, as the registering court retains ultimate dis-
cretion,84 based upon a catch-all provision for recogni-
tion based upon ‘if it is just and convenient that the
judgment should be enforced in the United Kingdom’.85
The 1933 UK Act, however, moves the Model towards
82. Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 (UK). The provi-
sions of this Act with respect to jurisdiction and recognition and
enforcement are similar to the approach in Singapore in the Reciprocal
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (Chapter 265), referred to at
footnote 77.
83. Ibid., s 4(2); Reciprocal Enforcement of Commonwealth Judgments Act
(Chapter 264) (Singapore) s 5(2).
84. A. Briggs, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (Informa Law from Rout-
ledge, 6th ed, 2015) 759.
85. Administration of Justice Act 1920 (UK) 9.
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a more ‘closed’ basis: it expressly provides that foreign
judgments which can be registered pursuant to that Act
cannot be enforced in any other way.86 The Singaporean
Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement Act, for example,
follows more closely in the footsteps of the 1920 Act, as
residual recourse to common law recognition-and-
enforcement approaches are allowed.
Although each common law jurisdiction has its own
legal sources and precise approach to recognition and
enforcement, at a high level, most approaches can be
said to share two key features:87 first, a presumption in
favour of giving effect to foreign judgments; and, sec-
ond, despite (or perhaps because of) this presumption,
the enforcing court retains residual control to refuse to
give effect to judgments that offend fundamental proce-
dural protections or the public policy of the enforcing
States.88 Consistent with other transnational
approaches, these exceptions to the presumption are
limited. They arise only in circumstances where: pro-
ceedings are in some way ‘irregular’, that is, occasioned
by either a breach of due process, such as by fraud, or a
breach of natural justice; or, if giving effect to the for-
eign judgment conflicts with the public policy of the
enforcing State, for example in cases where the issue or
issues ‘resolved’ by the foreign judgment have already
been decided elsewhere (as giving effect to such judg-
ments offends fundamental moral and legal values). See,
for example, the case of Tahan v. Hodgson, where the
District of Columbia Circuit Court notes that interna-
tional commerce requires that foreign judgments be rec-
ognised, except where inconsistent with fundamental
concepts of justice and fairness in US law such that it is
‘repugnant to fundamental notions of what is decent and
just’.89 Additionally, the ‘thrust of English cases’, as
well as the ‘thrust’ of jurisdictions derived from English
common law, is that foreign judgments should generally
be given effect to, ‘unless the foreign judgment contra-
dicts fundamental principles’ of the enforcing court.90
Yet, a crucial part of the process of recognition and
enforcement in most common law jurisdictions that fol-
86. Section 6 provides that ‘No proceedings for the recovery of a sum paya-
ble under a foreign judgment, being a judgment to which this Part of
this Act applies, other than proceedings by way of registration of the
judgment, shall be entertained by any court in the United Kingdom.’
87. In the United States, this formulation can be traced back to Hilton v.
Guyot (1895) 159 US 113, 144. This continues to inform current recog-
nition-and-enforcement practice: G. Born, International Civil Litigation
in United States Courts: Commentary and Materials (Kluwer Law Inter-
national, 1996) 12, discusses extensively Hilton’s approach to recogni-
tion and enforcement of judgments and the (significant) extent to
which it informs modern practice despite a range of developments and
codification in some States. See, for examples of Australian and English
approaches, respectively: M. Davies, A. Bell & P. Brereton, Nygh’s Con-
flict of Laws in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 9th ed., 2014) 895
(and following); A. V. Dicey, L. Collins & J. H. C. Morris, Dicey, Morris
and Collins on the Conflict of Laws (Sweet & Maxwell, 2015) 15.
88. See eg In Sik Choi v. Kim, Lee & Or 50 F 3d 233 (3rd Circuit 1995) at
252, where the court stresses that comity should be accorded to the
greatest extent possible to respect foreign laws.
89. 662 F 2d 862 (DC Circuit 1981) at 864-8.
90. J. Turner, ‘Enforcing Foreign Judgments at Common Law in New Zea-
land: Is the Concept of Comity Still Relevant?’ 2013(4) New Zealand
Law Review 653, at 669 (2013).
low the English approach involves a review of the ren-
dering court’s jurisdiction as a necessary requirement
before the presumption in favour of recognition and
enforcement operates. For example, it is seen as the
‘first and foremost prerequisite’, or as a ‘fundamental
requirement’, that when enforcing a judgment in person-
am (distinct from a judgment in rem91) foreign court has
exercised a jurisdiction that the enforcing court recogni-
ses in its own conflict of laws.92 As noted in Dicey,
Morris and Collins’ Conflict of Laws:93
It is not enough, it must be again emphasised, that
the foreign court is duly invested with jurisdiction
under the foreign legal system. It must also have
jurisdiction according to the English rules of the con-
flict of laws.
This is commonly referred to as ‘international jurisdic-
tion’ or ‘jurisdiction in the international sense’. Under
such a conception, it is ‘irrelevant’, for the purposes of
recognition and enforcement, whether the foreign court
had jurisdiction according to that foreign court’s own
law.94 Instead, what matters is that the enforcing court
is satisfied that the rendering court has exercised some
form of jurisdiction that the enforcing court considers
acceptable under its own laws. The traditional basis for
doing so in in personam cases has been broadly classed
into four categories based upon:95 presence in the ren-
dering State, participation in proceedings, submission
via voluntary appearance or voluntary submission to the
rendering court’s jurisdiction.96 This was emphasised
perhaps most recently by the English Court of Appeal
in Adams v. Cape Industries, which noted that at the rec-
ognition-and-enforcement stage:97
in determining the jurisdiction of the foreign court
… our court is directing its mind to the competence
or otherwise of the foreign court to summon the
defendant before it and to decide such matters as it
has decided … in the absence of any form of submis-
91. Despite the ready recognition of judgments in rem under English com-
mon law – for example, judgments that relate to immovable property,
or adjudicate on status – these judgments rarely come for enforcement:
Dicey, Collins and Morris, above n. 87, at [14-110]. For this reason, we
focus on in personam jurisdiction, as this is the jurisdiction most likely to
be implicated by third-party SICC cases (which necessarily have a com-
mercial character) and most likely to require recognition and enforce-
ment in a foreign enforcing court.
92. Davies, Bell & Brereton, above n. 87, at 4.04; Dicey, Collins and Morris,
above n. 87, at [14-055].
93. Dicey, Collins & Morris, above n. 87, at [14-129].
94. Briggs, above n. 84, at 692.
95. Dicey, Collins & Morris, above n. 87, at [14R-044] (and accompanying
commentary). See, further for a detailed exposition of English case law
on international jurisdiction, Briggs, above n. 84, at 690-715.
96. This formulation of acceptable international jurisdiction is similar to
what is required in other common law recognition-and-enforcement
approaches that derive from the English tradition: see, further, Reyes,
above n. 26, at 338; Aratra Potato Company Limited Morello Interna-
tional Limited v. The Owners of the Ship ‘El Amria’ 1979 Folio 326
(Unreported, ewhc.qb.admiralty); see, e.g., in Canada, T. J. Monestier,
‘Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments’ 42 Advocates’
Quarterly 107, at 110 (2013–2014).
97. Adams v. Cape Industries Plc [1990] Ch. 433, 517-8.
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sion to the foreign court, such competence depends
on the physical presence of the defendant in the
country concerned at the time of the suit
This insistence on some form of presence or deemed or
actual submission – similar to the transnational instru-
ments analysed above – presents a very real problem for
the enforceability of SICC judgments that compulsorily
join non-consenting parties.
Furthermore, given that international jurisdiction is a
fundamental prerequisite to recognition and enforce-
ment, it would logically follow that it would offend the
public policy of the enforcing court to give effect to
such a judgment. This point is made, in the context of
the 2005 Convention, by Black and Pitel, who argue that
it is possible that recognition and enforcement may be
denied based on an extension of jurisdiction based upon
the ‘closely related’ doctrine being considered ‘manifest-
ly incompatible’ with the public policy of the enforcing
State.98 Common law recognition and enforcement also
limits recognition and enforcement on this basis. For
example, as noted in Dicey, Morris and Collins: ‘A for-
eign judgment is impeachable on the ground that its
enforcement or, as the case may be, recognition, would
be contrary to public policy’.99 The same is true under
the 1933 Commonwealth Model Act, which provides, in
s 4(1)(v), that registration of a foreign judgment must be
set aside if ‘the enforcement of the judgment would be
contrary to public policy’ in the enforcing court. By
contrast, the 1920 Act, in s 9(1)(2)(f), only excludes
judgments where the ‘cause of action’ plead in the pro-
ceeding ‘could not have been entertained by the regis-
tering court’. It is, nonetheless, arguable that pursuing a
cause of action against a non-consenting party with no
recognised jurisdictional basis (in the enforcing court, at
least) could satisfy this ground. Thus, it is likely that a
judgment against a non-consenting party who lacks any
deemed or actual presence or submission to the render-
ing could offends public policy and hence, stands as a
bar to recognition and enforcement under both the com-
mon law and the Commonwealth Model Acts (acting as
a proxy for other common-law-based or inspired recip-
rocal recognition-and-enforcement regimes).
For these reasons – and although joinder without terri-
torial links, or links based on presence or submission to
jurisdiction, is permissible under Singaporean law –
enforcing courts in English common law jurisdictions
are not compelled to enforce such judgments. This may
be either due to a strict conception of a ‘prerequisite’
requirement of jurisdiction or even because of the
potential application of an overriding public policy con-
cern as to the appropriateness of the SICC exercising
jurisdiction over a foreign entity in a transaction that
occurred outside the bounds of the State’s (Singapore’s)
jurisdiction. Thus, we are left in much the same posi-
tion as considering statutory or transnational regimes:
absent another jurisdictional basis (such as consent or a
98. Black and Pitel, above n. 7, at 58 (fn 120).
99. Dicey, Collins and Morris, above n. 87, Rule 51.
territorial link), none of the approaches to recognition
and enforcement analysed compel recognition and
enforcement of third-party SICC judgments.
4 Concluding Remarks
Whilst the SICC is likely to be an attractive competitor
to arbitration as a mechanism for transnational dispute
resolution, it lacks the capacity to promote the ready
enforceability of its judgments against compulsorily
joined non-consenting parties internationally. We have
established that this difficulty arises when the SICC’s
flexible mandate to join non-consenting parties (under
Singaporean law) meets a lack of transnational obliga-
tions to recognise and enforce. This is so under all major
transnational recognition-and-enforcement instruments,
both extant and proposed, as well as the Common-
wealth-inspired recognition-and-enforcement approach
(underpinned by the common law). This is because
these approaches require the enforcing court to be satis-
fied that the judgment was rendered under an accepta-
ble jurisdictional base: usually a manifestation of con-
sent or a territorial link to Singapore, the host jurisdic-
tion of the SICC. Consequently, even if a broader rec-
ognition-and-enforcement instrument is achieved
through the implementation of the Draft Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judg-
ments, this will do little to promote the enforcement
prospects of third-party SICC judgments. Similar issues
are also evident under the Commonwealth-inspired
Reciprocal Enforcement Acts, where obligations are
only imposed upon enforcing courts to give effect to
judgments against third parties where that party either
consents, or a substantial link between the third party
and the jurisdiction of the rendering court exists. Con-
sequently, the SICC’s approach to joinder leads where
international recognition-and-enforcement practice has
not yet trod. This means that where recourse to foreign
recognition and enforcement is likely to be necessary
against a non-consenting party compulsorily joined to
SICC proceedings, any resulting judgments will be dif-
ficult to enforce, and, hence, the SICC is likely to pro-
ceed with caution in exercising this power.
Nonetheless, these enforcement difficulties do not nec-
essarily spell the end of the utility of the SICC’s efforts
to compulsorily join non-consenting parties. First and
foremost, if the non-consenting party has assets within
Singapore, a Singaporean court will not go behind the
SICC’s exercise of jurisdiction – particularly as the
SICC is constituted as a division of the High Court of
Singapore. In this sense, third-party joinder can be con-
sidered successful if no recourse is needed beyond Sin-
gapore. Second, and additionally, the prospect of third-
party joinder within Singapore may promote third par-
ties to consent or submit to the jurisdiction of the SICC,
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even absent any territorial links.100 Of course, the most
effective option to promote enforcement prospects
would be to receive the consent of any third parties pri-
or to the dispute via the preemptive inclusion of juris-
diction clauses in all agreements between all potential
disputing parties.101 Whilst this is certainly possible, it
is difficult in practice to draft and secure consistent
dispute resolution clauses in a range of contracts than
can span numerous contracting parties and many
years.102 Instead, it may be that the SICC’s reputation is
used once a dispute has arisen to promote to potential
third parties the benefits (efficiency, expertise and so on)
that consenting to SICC proceedings may offer.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the SICC’s man-
date to compulsorily join non-consenting parties – and
the eventual exercise of this power – will continue to
place practical pressure on enforcing courts (and their
host jurisdictions) to recognise and enforce any resulting
judgment. This is largely because, despite the lack of
transnational obligations to do so,103 foreign enforcing
courts can take a more permissive approach to recognis-
ing and enforcing such judgments if they so choose.104
Thus, domestic approaches may be more permissive in
giving effect to a third-party SICC judgment, based
upon the extent to which they embody a degree of dis-
cretion and are potentially amenable to legal develop-
ment. That is, where there is greater ‘familiarity, trust
and confidence’ in a particular State or its rendering
courts, there is a greater prospect of its judgment being
recognised and enforced.105 In such cases, competing
factors in recognition and enforcement – such as the
finality of proceedings – may favour giving effect to the
SICC judgment against a non-consenting party, to avoid
expensive (and potentially unnecessary) re-litigation of
the matter.106 Singapore will be assisted in this sense by
100. Bettoni, cited at footnote 13, above, provides an overview of the kinds
of pressures that a third party may face, even where they may not have
assets in a particular jurisdiction.
101. As Black and Pitel note, it is now ‘widely accepted’ that forum-selection
clauses should be presumptively enforced: Black and Pitel, above n. 7,
at 26.
102. Hwang, above n. 1, at 195; Reyes, above n. 26, at 357.
103. Indeed, this is likely to be one of the key ways that legal development
occurs with respect to transnational recognition-and-enforcement
instruments, as the legal ordering surrounding recognition and enforce-
ment (in both the 2005 Convention and the advanced Draft Conven-
tion) is unlikely to substantially change or update, given the ‘incremen-
talist’ nature of transnational private law-making: see, further, S. Block-
Lieb and T. Halliday, ‘Incrementalisms in Global Lawmaking’ 32(3)
Brooklyn Journal of International Law (2007).
104. This option remains open to enforcing courts, as transnational recogni-
tion-and-enforcement instruments allow residual recourse to more per-
missive domestic (municipal) recognition-and-enforcement approaches.
That is, enforcing courts can never violate any transnational obligations
by giving effect to foreign decisions; instead, ‘only by failing to do so’:
Paulsson, above n. 72, at 124.
105. This suggests only that the ‘greater the familiarity, trust and confidence,
the greater the willingness to enforce: conversely, the greater the igno-
rance and suspicion, the more reluctant we would be to grant enforce-
ment’: Ho, above n. 81, at 448. It should not be taken to suggest that
Singaporean judgments are likely to be treated in a similar way to other
mutual recognition schemes that have a mandatory nature (e.g.,, the
approach in the Brussels I system).
106. Ibid., 60.
its long-standing efforts to build and maintain its
‘brand-name and reputation’ in dispute resolution,
based on ‘trust, neutrality and efficiency’.107 Such com-
ments are not mere marketing hyperbole.108 Based on
these reputational claims, it may even be that there is
some advantage to recognition and enforcement of
SICC judgments over arbitral awards. This will be
assisted by the fact that considerations of both State and
judicial comity and reciprocity are likely to resound
more heavily with respect to the emanation of State
power contained in a judgment vis a vis an emanation of
private decision making in the form of an arbitral
award.109
For now, the SICC has done all that it can unilaterally
do to promote an approach to joinder of non-consenting
parties that is both novel internationally and designed to
be commercially flexible for international disputants.
The true success of these measures, however, can only
be measured when such a judgment is rendered, and it
comes for recognition and enforcement in a foreign
State. Until then, focus will increasingly be placed upon
how legislatures and enforcing courts around the world
would treat such a judgment and whether they might
– or should – adopt similar procedures or give SICC
judgments against non-consenting parties ultimate effi-
cacy beyond Singapore.
107. Singapore Minister for Law (Kasiviswanathan Shanmugam), ‘Opening
Address’ (SIAC Congress 2016, 27 May 2016) [8], available at: https://
www.mlaw.gov.sg/content/minlaw/en/news/speeches/opening-
address-by-minister-for-law--k-shanmugam--at-siac-congre.html
(accessed 22 December 2018). This reputation is not solely tied to one
institution – like the SICC – but instead reflects a combination of per-
ceptions about Singaporean institutions generally. Perhaps most promi-
nently for international commercial disputants, these are the existing
national courts of Singapore, the Singapore International Arbitral Centre
(SIAC), the Singapore International Mediation Centre. The SICC also
attempts to market not just its own prowess but Singapore’s overall
‘legal infrastructure’, by reference to its well-developed and respected
institutions and its ‘efficient, competent and honest judiciary’, allowing
it to serve as a ‘neutral third party venue’, thereby making it the right
choice to provide effective decision-making services: Singapore Interna-
tional Commercial Court Committee, above n. 5, at 10,15.
108. Singapore is widely recognised as an efficient jurisdiction for resolving
commercial disputes, with one of the lowest ‘congestion rates’ globally
(caseload divided by resolved cases) and high user- and academic per-
ceptions of effectiveness and efficiency: Dakolias, ‘Court Performance
around the World: A Comparative Perspective’ 2(1) Yale Human Rights
and Development Journal 87, at 103, 131-4 (1999). Recent indicators
remain in line with this image: see, e.g., the 2017 IMD World Competi-
tiveness Yearbook. The Yearbook, which combines statistical and survey
data, regularly places Singapore in the top ranking of nations from the
perspective of business, legal and regulatory competitiveness (Singapore
comes in third globally in 2017).
109. Ho, above n. 81, at 453-4.
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